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Abstract.  This paper shows that a decision maker using the CAPM for valuing firms and making 
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Introduction 
 In the corporate finance literature, the classical Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth 
CAPM) is employed for firm valuation as well as capital budgeting decision making (e.g. 
Rubinstein, 1973; Rao, 1992; Brealey and Myers, 2000; Damodaran, 2001; Fernández, 2002, or any 
other finance textbook). The value of a firm is given by the discounted free cash flows, where the 
discount rate is the risk-adjusted cost of capital. The latter is computed by making use of the CAPM 
pricing relation and equals the risk-free rate plus the product of the beta times the difference 
between expected market rate of return and risk-free rate of return. The value is the maximum price 
the buyer is ready to pay for the firm. If the firm’s actual price is smaller that the firm value (or, in 
other terms, if the NPV is positive), then the purchase of the firm is a profitable investment. 
It is common in corporate finance to use the CAPM-derived disequilibrium NPV to appraise 
firms and investments (e.g. Bossaerts and Ødegaard, 2001). In the disequilibrium NPV the value 
depends on the disequilibrium beta, which in turn depends on the project’s cost. Magni (2007b) 
shows that the disequilibrium beta is validly deducted from the CAPM for decision making and that 
the use of the disequilibrium NPV is extensive in corporate finance.  
This paper shows that the disequilibrium NPV is inconsistent with Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1958) Proposition I (MM-I), which asserts that a firm value is invariant under changes in the 
debt/equity mix. This implies that the principle of arbitrage, a fundamental principle of economic 
rationality (Nau and McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999) is not fulfilled and that the disequilibrium Net 
Present Value is nonadditive. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 makes use of a simple example where two 
firms generating the same free cash flow are valued; one of them is levered, the other one is 
unlevered, and it turns out that the disequilibrium CAPM-based NPV provides different values. 
Section 2 shows that economic agents using this NPV are open to arbitrage losses. In sections 3-4 
MM-I is applied to value the two firms.  Some remarks on nonadditivity are presented in section 5. 
The concluding section briefly summarizes the results. 
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  Notational conventions of the paper are collected in Table 1. All the examples refer, for 
simplicity, to one period, but the same results hold for perpetual cash flows. All numbers are 
rounded off to the second or third decimal. 
1. The example 
 Consider the security market described in Table 2, where a risky asset and a risk-free asset 
are traded and two possible states may occur, conventionally labeled ‘good’ and ‘bad’, with 
probability 0.8 and 0.2 respectively.1 The market is complete, is assumed to be in equilibrium (all 
marketed assets lie on the SML) and arbitrage is not possible. Suppose now that economic agent B 
(=buyer) faces the following problem: He is offered the opportunity of purchasing one of two firms, 
both of which will operate only the next period and then will shut down. One of the firm is equity-
financed (firm U), the other one is levered (firm L). Agent U (=unlevered) owns the shares of firm 
U and is ready to sell the firm at a minimum price of 9000. Firm L’s shares are owned by agent E 
(=equity) which is ready to sell the shares for a minimum of 7000, while agent D (=debt) owns firm 
L’s debt, which is a loan just stipulated for an amount of 2000 with a 7.14% contractual rate. For 
such a loan agent D is ready to accept not less than the 2000 just lent to the firm. Agent B is willing 
to evaluate the two firms and decide about possible purchase. To this end, he analyzes the two firms 
and after thorough investigations, studies and forecasts, he collects the following data (see Table 3): 
• The Free Cash Flow of both firms at time 1 will be 13300 in good state and 7800 in bad 
state2 
• The Debt Cash Flow of firm L at time 1 will be 7500=7000(1.0714). Given the forecasts on 
the Free Cash Flow, the debt is not risky. 
• The Equity Cash Flow of firm L at time 1 will be consequently 5800 in good state and 300 
in bad state. 
                                                 
1 The market is a very simple one just for the sake of convenience (for a market with three securities and some results 
dealing with capital budgeting decisions see Magni, 2007a, 2007b). 
2 The free cash flow of firm U is obviously an equity cash flow, given that the firm is unlevered. 
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Agent B applies the disequilibrium NPV. To value the firms, he needs the beta of firm U as well as 
the betas of both equity and debt of firm L. But the betas are functions of the rates of return and the 
latter are in turn functions of the outlay required for receiving the cash flows. In general, if 
DeU PPP ,,  are the costs for acquiring firm U’s equity, firm L’s equity, and firm L’s debt, 
respectively, we have: 
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The further step is to compute the required rates of return using the SML (Security Market Line) 
equation: 
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Substituing (2) in (3) we have 
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so that the values are 
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Applying (5) to the particular case at hand, agent B finds (see Table 3) 
9150=UV , 2380=E , 6521=D . 
This valuation contradicts  MM-I, since 
LU VV ==+≠= 8901652123809150 . 
Financially, agent B commits a nonsense: He faces two equivalent assets generating the cash-flow 
stream ( UP− , FCF). Yet, agent B values them in different ways. 3 
2. Arbitrage losses 
 Not only is agent B irrational in that he computes different values for financially equivalent 
alternatives, but he is also susceptible to arbitrage losses. Let us see. Suppose, for the sake of 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that this striking result does not depend on the fact that the debt rate is different from the risk-free 
rate. Even if we had fD rr =  the valuation would not be consistent with MM-I. Assuming %15=Dr  we have 
DPD == 6521 and using eq. (5) we still have .89019150 LU VV =≠=  
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convenience, that a single agent DEU owns shares and debt of both firms U and L.4 Agent DEU 
offers agent B the following course of action: 
“We borrow 9149 from you and will repay the amount FCF* at time 1”. 
Agent B accepts, since 
01915091499149
1
FCF9149 >=+−=+−=++− UU
V
k
 
Agent DEU then offers agent B another course of action: 
“We lend you 2479 and you will repay us the amount ECF* at time 1”. 
Agent B accepts again, since 
09923802479
975.01
0.2(300)0.8(5800)2479
1
ECF2479 >=−=+
+−=+− ek
 
Finally, agent DEU offers agent B the following course of action: 
“We lend you 6620 and you will repay us the amount CFD at time 1”. 
Again, agent B accepts, since 
09965216620
15.01
75006620
1
CFD6620 >=−=+−=+− Dk
. 
But so doing, agent B is trapped in an arbitrage loss (while agent DEU realizes an arbitrage profit): 
He spends 50 today and receives nothing at time 1 (the cash flows for agent B are collected in Table 
4. Agent DEU’s cash flow are the same reversed in sign). 
3. Firm value according to MM-I 
 Let us calculate the firm value using MM-I, therefore making use of the principle of arbitrage. 
As for firm U, consider a portfolio of 55 shares of the risky security and 36.739 units of the risk-
free asset. The value of such a portfolio today is 9173.9=55(100)+36.739(100). At time 1, the 
owner of such a portfolio will receive 13300=55(165)+36.739(115) in the good state and 
7800=55(65)+36.739(115) in the bad state. This portfolio replicates firm U’s free cash flow. 
                                                 
4 This is not restrictive at all. We could have keep on dealing with agents D, U and E, but a single representative agent 
DEU makes presentation simpler and shorter. 
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Therefore, the one-price law leads us to 9.9173=UV . Also, consider a portfolio consisting of a 
long position on the risky asset (55 shares) and a short position on the risk-free security (28.478 
units). Its value is )100(478.28)100(552.2652 −= . Such a portfolio replicates firm L’s equity cash 
flow: 5800=55(165)−28.478(115) in the good state, and 300=55(65)−28.478(115) in the bad state. 
Accordingly, the one-price law tells us that the value of firm L’s equity 2.2652=E . 
 Finally, consider a portfolio consisting of 65.217 units of the risk-free asset. Its value is 
)100(217.657.6521 = . Such a portfolio replicates the debt cash flow of firm L: 
7500=65.217(115) in both states, so that the debt value is 7.6521=D . 
Consequently, we have 
LU VDEV =+=+== 7.65212.26529.9173 . 
To sum up, the CAPM-based values of firm U and firm L do not coincide each other and both are 
inconsistent with the (unique) value found via arbitrage pricing  (i.e. via MM-I), which guarantees 
that the one-price law holds. 
 It is also noteworthy that agent B is missing an arbitrage opportunity. He actually rejects to 
purchase firm L (equity+debt). But he could sell short 36.739 units of the risk-free security and 55 
shares of the risky security, while buying firm L for the total amount of 9000. At time 0, he would 
have a net gain of 55(100)+36.739(100)−9000=173.9 whereby at time 1 he could use the free cash 
flow of firm L to close off the position in the security market, with no net expenditure. Therefore, 
users of CAPM-based (disequilibrium) NPV are not only subject to arbitrage losses, but they may 
even miss some arbitrage opportunities. 
4. Generalizing 
 The examples above shown are just particular cases of a more general result. Let )(DV  be 
the firm value seen as a function of the debt.5 Formally, MM-I may be rephrased saying that  
 
                                                 
5 With this notation, we have the value of the unlevered firm is )0(VVU = . 
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)()( 21 DVDV =  for any 21 DD ≠ .     (6) 
We now show that if firm valuation is realized via disequilibrium values, eq. (6) above is not 
satisfied. Bearing in mind that ECF=FCF−CFD and assuming that the cash flow to debt is riskless, 
we have 
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Taking the derivative with respect to D, we have 
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In general, we have 0)(d ≠
D
DV ,6 which means that )(DV  is not constant. This boils down to 
saying that )(DV  is not invariant under changes in D, i.e. eq. (6) is not fulfilled. In particular, we 
have )()0( DVV ≠  whenever 0≠D . The example in section 1 above is just a particular case of this 
general result where we have picked 6521=D , so that LU VVVV =≠= )6521()0( . 
5. Nonadditivity 
 The results above shown may be rephrased in terms of additivity. To see a project or a firm 
as an aggregate quantity generating free cash flow (firm U) or a disaggregate quantity generating 
equity cash flow and debt cash flow (firm L) is only a matter of convention, and the property of 
                                                 
6 We have 0)(d =
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additivity should be fulfilled by any rational methodology of asset valuation. In other terms, we 
should have  
NPV(E)+NPV(D)=NPV(E+D). 
But the previous sections just imply that the NPV is nonadditive, since 
)(NPV
)()()NPV()NPV(
DEVPVP
DEPDPEPDE
UULU
UDe
+=+−≠+−=
++−=+−++−=+
 
(see also Magni, 2007a, 2007b, for issues of nonadditivity). 
 From a decisional point of view, the nonadditivity of the valuation has serious consequences 
for decision making: Agent B has the opportunity of purchasing firm U’s shares, or, alternatively, 
buying both equity and debt of firm L. The two alternatives are just the same from a financial point 
of view. Yet, as Table 3 shows, agent B considers it profitable to buy U’s equity (NPV=150), 
whereas he considers it not worth purchasing equity and debt of firm L, (NPV= −99). He then takes 
two different decisions for the same course of action. This absurd behavior is just due to the 
nonadditivity of the NPV. Nonadditivity means that valuation and/or decision changes if the 
problem at hand is differently framed, although the descriptions of the problem are logically 
equivalent. Financially, the cash flow generated by a firm should be valued by decision makers 
univocally, irrespective of whether it is considered an aggregate quantity (FCF) or a disaggregate 
quantity (ECF+CFD). Therefore, agent B incurs what behavioral scholars call a “framing effect” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; 
Qualls and Puto, 1989; Roszkowski and Snelbecker, 1990). 
Conclusions 
 This paper shows that: 
• The use of CAPM-based disequilibrium NPV for valuing firms is not consistent with 
arbitrage pricing 
• The CAPM-based disequilibrium NPV changes under changes in the debt/equity mix, so 
infringing Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I (and the principle of arbitrage) 
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• Agents using disequilibrium NPVs are open to arbitrage losses and may miss arbitrage 
opportunities 
• The disequilibrium Net Present Value is nonadditive 
• Agents using disequilibrium NPVs are subject to framing effects 
Although the NPV as a decision rule is deductively drawn from the CAPM, its use for valuation and 
for decision-making is a mis-use, leading to biases, arbitrage losses, misses of arbitrage profits, 
framing effects.7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 It is worth noting the use of the equilibrium NPV does not guarantee correct valuations (see Dybvig and Ingersoll, 
1982, Magni, 2007b). 
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Table 1. Notations 
FCF*  Free Cash Flow (random) of firms U and L 
ECF* Equity Cash Flow (random) of firm L 
CFD* Debt Cash Flow (random) of firm L 
FCF Free Cash Flow (expected) of firms U and L 
ECF Equity Cash Flow (expected) of firm L 
CFD Debt Cash Flow (expected) of firm L 
E  Equity value 
D  Debt value 
UV  Value of firm U 
LV  Value of firm L 
)(DV  Firm value as a function of debt 
UP  Selling price of firm U’s equity 
eP  Selling price of firm L’s equity 
DP  Selling price of firm L’s debt 
ur~  Rate of return of firm U’s equity 
er~  Rate of return of firm L’s equity 
Dr  Rate of return of firm L’s debt 
uβ  Beta of firm U’s equity 
eβ  Beta of firm L’s equity 
Dβ  Beta of firm L’s debt 
mr~  Market rate of return (random) 
mr  Market rate of return (expected) 
fr  Risk-free rate  
cov Covariance 
uk  Cost of equity of firm U 
ek  Cost of equity of firm L 
Dk  Cost of debt of firm L 
NPV Net present value 
MM-I Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I 
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Table 2. The security market 
 Security 
44 844 76
 
 
  
 
Risky    Risk-free Market 
  
Outstanding shares 10 10 10   
    State Probability 
Good 0.8 
Cash Flow ⎩⎨
⎧
65
165
 ⎩⎨
⎧
115
115
 ⎩⎨
⎧
650
1650
 
Bad 0.2 
Good 0.8 
Rate of return (%) ⎩⎨
⎧
−35
65
 ⎩⎨
⎧
15
15
 ⎩⎨
⎧
− 35
65
 
Bad 0.2 
Expected rate of return (%) 45 15 45   
Covariance with the market 
rate of return 0.16 0 0.16 
  
Beta 1 0 1 
  
Value 100 100 2000 
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Table 3. Firm valuation 
Firm U Firm L 
  ECF* ⎩⎨
⎧
300
5800
 
  CFD*=CFD 7500 
FCF* ⎩⎨
⎧
7800
13300
 FCF* ⎩⎨
⎧
7800
13300
 
  eP  2000 
UP  9000 DP  7000 
ur~  (%) ⎩⎨
⎧
− 33.13
77.47
 er~  (%) ⎩⎨
⎧
− 85
190
 
  Dr  (%) 7.14 
uβ  1.222 eβ  5.5 
  Dβ  0 
uk  (%) 33.33 ek  (%) 97.5 
  Dk  (%) 15 
  E  2380 
  D  6521 
UV  9150 LV  8901 
NPV 150 NPV −99 
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Table 4. Arbitrage loss 
 Cash flow at time 0 Cash flow at time 1 
1st course of action 
(agent B lends) 
−9149 FCF* 
2nd course of action 
(agents B borrows) 
2479 −ECF* 
3rd course of action 
(agent B borrows) 
6620 −CFD 
Overall −50 0 
 
